Political Minefields » Private security companies

Op-Ed on Military Privatization

Matthew Bolton — Mon, 21 Dec 2009 15:50:56 +0000

Based on my research on landmine clearance contracting, I wrote an editorial in The Examiner (Independence, MO) this weekend on the risks of military privatization in Afghanistan. It focuses on hearings in the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the US Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, chaired by my senator, Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.).

Click here to read my editorial.

McCaskill has also led investigations into the allegations of misconduct by ArmorGroup (now part of G4S), a security and demining contractor, in Afghanistan. For more information on my research into commercial demining contracting, click here.

Tagged: Afghanistan, ArmorGroup, Claire McCaskill, Commercial companies, commercial demining, Contracting, Demining, G4S, Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, Independence, landmines, Private security companies, Privatization, public-private partnerships, Senate, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, The Examiner

Commercial Demining and Security Industries Consolidating, Merging

Matthew Bolton — Tue, 05 Aug 2008 00:32:58 +0000

There have always been links between the commercial demining, private security and defense industries. In the early 1990s, arms and security companies like Royal Ordnance (now BAE Systems Land and Armaments), MECHEM (part of South African arms firm DENEL), Saracen International and DSL (now ArmorGroup) played a prominant role in the developing sector of ‘humanitarian’ demining. In those early years, some commercial demining companies were accused of ‘double dipping’ for being involved in both mine production and clearance.

These days we seem to be observing even greater consolidation – blurring the lines between civilian demining companies and the more militarized private security contractors. This has been driven largely by the security contracting boom in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as commercial deminers working in much more insecure conditions than previously.

DynCorp, which has a particularly controversial reputation as a provider of private security, police and counternarcotics services, is one of the three main pre-selected contractors for the State Department’s mine action programs. The other two State Department contractors, ArmorGroup and RONCO were recently bought up by global security giant Group 4 Securicor (see this article on the RONCO purchase, and this one on ArmorGroup).

Other demining and EOD firms are moving into private security provision. They often developed an internal security capacity while working in a dangerous place and then found it profitable to provide this service to other clients. EODT claims to offer “a range of direct security solutions for clients in high-risk situations.” MineTech sells “highly skilled Explosive Detection Dogs to security and affiliated companies.” UXB claims to “have the capability to perform site security threat and facility vulnerability assessments, and provide turn-key security and safety solutions.”

To a certain extent this merging of private security contracting and commercial demining makes sense. Both activities occur in conflicted regions, rely on similar logistical supply chains and draw on an overlapping pool of personnel — mostly former soldiers. Mine action, while less profitable, may also provide a more stable and less risky part of a security company’s portfolio.

However, I believe there are some real dangers in smudging the distinction between demining, which has often been viewed as a civilian and humanitarian endeavor, and the militarized industry of private security. If demining becomes associated with a military campaign, it threatens the lives of civilian humanitarian deminers working for NGOs. Moreover, in my own field research I have found private security companies are far less likely to understand local developmental needs, cultural sensitivies and humanitarian priorities than NGOs and local authorities.

For a good investigation of the impact of private security companies on the civilian population in Afghanistan and Angola, see this paper from Swiss Peace Foundation. For my critique of the role of private security companies’ involvement in Afghan demining, click here.

Dealing with ‘Clandestine Structures’ in Conflict Zones

Matthew Bolton — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 04:29:55 +0000

Contemporary conflicts radically reorganize the political and economic systems of societies, empowering ‘clandestine structures,’ built by covert action, smuggling, war profiteering, black markets and organized crime. This ‘underground’, eschewing transparency and rule-based politics and economics, poses an enormous danger to international peacebuilding efforts.

Demining agencies offer telling insights into the nexus between international agencies and clandestine structures because they often employ significant numbers of demobilized soldiers, many of whom may have links to clandestine structures, and require information, access and goods that may be controlled by such networks. There are three basic responses demining agencies can take to this issue:

1. Collusion — This is the easiest route, as the people and organizations best positioned to ‘get things done’ are usually the power structures that arose during the war. However, they may have deeply illiberal agendas that can subvert the program; strengthening and funding them may also do damage to the peace process.

2. Avoidance and Neutrality — Trying to avoid close contact with the clandestine structures and/or remaining neutral from all armed groups can prevent a demining organization getting drawn into the conflict. However, remaining neutral may be extremely difficult to do in the polarized politics of the war and post-war period.

3. Building alternative structures — The ideal solution would be to build alternative structures based on ideals of humanitarianism, pluralism, non-violence and a commitment to the democratic process. Some international demining NGOs have come close to this ideal in a few programs. However, it can be painstakingly slow, expensive and difficult because these new structures pose a threat to the clandestine networks that become so powerful in conflict.

For more information, have a look at this article, which appeared (in English) in a German journal, which analyzes how demining agencies dealt with clandestine networks in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan.

The Commercialization of Afghan Demining

Matthew Bolton — Tue, 29 Jul 2008 00:26:02 +0000

Afghan demining is in a period of momentous change. After years of UN-led and NGO-implemented mine action, the last few years have seen the influx of commercial demining companies. This has the potential to enhance the capacity of Afghan demining, through greater profit-driven efficiency, innovation and specialization. Moreover, it is unlikely that many NGOs would be able, or willing, to do mine and UXO clearance tasks for the Coalition and Afghan militaries. Thus some involvement of commercial companies in Afghan demining should be welcomed. However, there are also several possible disadvantages to commercialization. Firstly, without tight controls and a clear regulatory framework, using commercial companies risks lowering the quality and safety of the demining process. Secondly, turning demining into a purchasable commodity risks drawing demining resources away from those who need mine clearance the most, as those who can pay get demining first. Finally, commercialization, which has seen the growing role of private security contractors in demining, has occurred in tandem with the merging of US aid and security policy in Afghanistan. As a result, there is a danger that neutral ‘humanitarian space’ for demining may be reduced.

After fieldwork based in Kabul in the winter of 2006, I felt very concerned about the fate of a humanitarian, needs-based demining program in Afghanistan and wrote this discussion paper published by the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Global Governance. I have not been to Afghanistan recently, so I do not know if things have improved since then — I am told that the UN has tightened up its regulation and control of the commercial companies. Perhaps someone who has been there recently can comment.

Read the whole paper here.