Here is an abstract of our article:

Medium-sized wealthy states – middle powers – and global civil society networks are increasingly joining forces to influence the global policy agenda on issues of international law, justice, humanitarianism and development. These middle power–NGO coalitions use the comparative advantages of both state and nonstate actors in synergistic partnerships. States represent the coalitions’ interests in international negotiations and conferences, provide donor funding and offer diplomatic support. For their part, NGOs gather on-the-ground research, provide technical expertise, lobby governments, mobilise public opinion and generate media publicity. This article uses the case of the campaign to ban cluster munitions, culminating in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, to examine the organisation, efforts and impact of such middle power–NGO coalitions.

To read the whole article, click here.

Much of the debate has focussed on whether to use foreign commercial companies to conduct clearance. (See this previous Political Minefields post).  However, Maslen said the Turkish government had not adequately considered the option of using international NGOs.  Another Turkish newspaper reported that HALO Trust “were aware of the debate in Turkey and might be interested [to help] if asked.”

Research by Political Minefields in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan has suggested that using humanitarian NGOs rather than commercial companies can often be a better move for demining programs. International NGOs are often safer and better able to communicate with the local population.

Casey-Maslen also questioned plans by the government to give long-term leases on the demined land to commercial companies that cleared it.  He said the government must consider the property rights of the land’s owners.

The demining profession is overwhelmingly dominated by men, largely due to demining agencies’ reliance on hiring former combatants and the often patriarchal contexts in which they work.  There has been a deep reluctance in many quarters to hire female deminers.

However, in several places, demining agencies have successfully deployed female deminers.  To read more about NPA’s female deminers in Sudan, click here.  In addition to providing employment and economic empowerment, hiring female deminers can be an important challenge to conceptions of masculinity forged during conflict.  To have women involved in the process of restoring security — traditionally a male role — can send a powerful message.

To learn more about gender issues in mine action, go to the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines’ ”Gender and Mine Action Portal.”  Specifically, have a look at their study on gender issues in mine action. Click here to read the UN’s policy on gender and mine action.

Demining agencies offer telling insights into the nexus between international agencies and clandestine structures because they often employ significant numbers of demobilized soldiers, many of whom may have links to clandestine structures, and require information, access and goods that may be controlled by such networks. There are three basic responses demining agencies can take to this issue:

1. Collusion — This is the easiest route, as the people and organizations best positioned to ‘get things done’ are usually the power structures that arose during the war.  However, they may have deeply illiberal agendas that can subvert the program; strengthening and funding them may also do damage to the peace process.

2. Avoidance and Neutrality — Trying to avoid close contact with the clandestine structures and/or remaining neutral from all armed groups can prevent a demining organization getting drawn into the conflict.  However, remaining neutral may be extremely difficult to do in the polarized politics of the war and post-war period.

3. Building alternative structures — The ideal solution would be to build alternative structures based on ideals of humanitarianism, pluralism, non-violence and a commitment to the democratic process. Some international demining NGOs have come close to this ideal in a few programs.  However, it can be painstakingly slow, expensive and difficult because these new structures pose a threat to the clandestine networks that become so powerful in conflict.

For more information, have a look at this article, which appeared (in English) in a German journal, which analyzes how demining agencies dealt with clandestine networks in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan.

In a statement posted on their website NPA forcibly refuted the allegations, saying the “current tendentious reporting in Sri Lankan media has no basis in facts.”  Indeed, NPA had reported LTTE’s forcible removal of eight vehicles from its compound to the National Steering Committee for Mine Action under the Ministry of Nation Building and Infrastructure Development. It had also lodged a complaint with the LTTE.

This smear campaign occurs in the context of an increasingly difficult environment for demining NGOs in Sri Lanka, a worsening human rights situation and a deterioration in security.

Demining programs necessarily occur during or after conflict and thus often struggle to negotiate the political tensions that can buffet them from all sides.  For examples from other countries see my case studies on Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan.

Sudan is an extremely difficult place to run a demining program.  Mine clearance agencies face astronomical prices of goods and services, monumental logistical challenges, bureaucratic impediments from government, fraught labor disputes and a deeply embedded political economy of conflict.  This multitude of problems has made Sudan one of the most unproductive demining programs, in terms of ordnance or area cleared per US dollar, in the world. This begs the question whether the level of international investment in Sudanese mine action is truly worth it. This paper will argue that in terms of saving lives or increasing access to socio-economic development, much of the money pouring into Sudanese mine action might be better spent in other severely mine-impacted countries.

However, other considerations make such a cost-benefit calculation more complicated. There may be a genuine argument for pouring funding into Sudan for the political reasons of supporting the peace between the North and South. The political, economic and social dividends from demining (including increased freedom of movement, return of displaced people and a reduction in perceptions of insecurity) may justify some of the high financial and other costs.  That said, donors should not deceive themselves about the limits to mine action’s ability play the role of a midwife of peace.

Following field research in Khartoum, Juba and Yei last year, I wrote this evaluation of issues in Sudanese demining.

After fieldwork based in Kabul in the winter of 2006, I felt very concerned about the fate of a humanitarian, needs-based demining program in Afghanistan and wrote this discussion paper published by the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Global Governance.  I have not been to Afghanistan recently, so I do not know if things have improved since then — I am told that the UN has tightened up its regulation and control of the commercial companies.  Perhaps someone who has been there recently can comment.

Read the whole paper here.

This report, which I co-authored with Hugh Griffiths, was quite controversial when it came out in 2006 and stirred a lot of strong feelings.  While I have since refined some of the less sophisticated statistical methods used in this report, I still stand by its general conclusions.

The report showed how, over a particular period, widespread ignorance of these political concerns had serious effects in Bosnia, where certain companies took advantage of the weak rule of law. As a result it suggests that corners may have been cut, lives put at risk and a significant portion of mine action funds appropriated by criminal-nationalist networks. Such outcomes were not in the best interests of Bosnia’s peace process.

Things have improved considerably in the Bosnian mine action program since the time this report focuses on.  So it should not really be read as an indictment of current Bosnian demining. Rather the intention is to help demining professionals learn from the mistakes made in one particular country, in one particular time.

Read it here.