It struck me as I was reading their book that, though they didn’t examine them in much depth, landmines played a crucial role in delineating the boundaries around these “cartographic fantasies.” That so many mines were laid is an indication of how much violent effort was required to  ’unmix’ Bosnia’s cosmopolitan geography. To emplace a minefield is an exercise in violent mapmaking, an effort to draw an explosive border between an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’. Unsurprisingly then, demining has been integrated into massive international effort, described by Toal and Dahlman, that has gone into reversing ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, this has not been a straightforward process — my research in Bosnia showed that the removal of mines has sometimes played into nationalist efforts to stymie and obstruct efforts to build a cosmopolitan future.

The mine action sector has somewhat of an obsession with maps. Walk into the offices of any demining agency and you will see walls plastered with maps of every scale, covered in red dots and “polygons”. What is somewhat surprising is that the sector as a whole tends to think of them rather straightforwardly and unproblematically. Toal and Dahlman come at maps from an alternative perspective, that of “critical geopolitics“, a broad critique of the social science tradition of accepting maps, borders and geography as unproblematic and “scientific.” For Toal and Dahlman, geopolitics is “less a determining location or a stable hierarchy”  than “a culturally embedded practice operating across networks of power” and a “field of competing political constructions.” A map tells you as much about the person(s) drawing it as the place that is drawn.

The demining map can be ”deconstructed” in a similar way. Charles Mather has shown how mine action’s obsession with  technical expertise, ‘information management’ and geographic information systems (GIS) mapping functions to depoliticize and marginalize local community voices in planning demining efforts. He tries to unpack the mine map to show how it is a product of “cadastral politics”, not simply a “scientific” process. Similarly, in my research on South Sudan I found that unintentionally, coloring red on UN maps roads that were not verified as mine-free may have contributed to the marginalization of “remote areas” in distribution of humanitarian aid.

In short, demining can never be an entirely “apolitical” and technocratic process because minefields are artifacts of political conflict, an attempt by political actors to reshape territorial space. Everything about the process of mine clearance – from information gathering to map-drawing to removing ordancne — is intrinsically political.

To read my full review of Toal and Dahlman’s book, click here.

At its root, my research into the political economy of aid for mine action is essentially a critique of the uncritical acceptance of conventional economic wisdom that privatization, deregulation and liberalization will lead us to a more prosperous and efficient economy. For years I had run into commercial demining managers parroting simplistic economic models suggesting that commercial tendering would make demining cheaper, faster, more efficient and safer. I heard many representatives of donor agencies repeating this line too. However, in my quantitative and qualitative PhD research at the London School of Economics I found that this conventional wisdom was not quite so straightforward. Making demining more competitive often led to higher accident rates, lower quality demining and less focus on the top humanitarian priorities. Competition, particularly in a region where there is a problem with enforcing the rule of law, can sometimes make public services worse (Read my book Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance for more details, an extract is available for free here).

Since completing my PhD, I have found similar research findings in other sectors, including humanitarian aid in Haiti, and a church’s social services. There is not a straightforward line between neo-liberal reforms and a better world. In fact, privatization, deregulation and liberalization can lead to greater inequality, a reduction in the quality of social services and political fragmentation.

This is why I, like the economists in the video embedded above, have joined the Occupy Movement. As I explained in my interview with the Daily Beast last month, while I do not always agree with some of the Movement’s more radical fringes, I believe they have opened up a conversation about what is wrong with our economy — the system that distributes scarce resources. When some 1.4 billion people live in poverty and over 925 million are hungry, we cannot pretend that our global political economy is serving humanity well. We need something better — a system that enables a more prosperous and equitable world, a system that protects us from economic and other risks, a system that fosters the ‘good life’, not ‘bare life’, for all human beings.

Traditional economists are often suspicious of politics — having assumed it out of their models, they are irritated when political reality comes crashing in and ruins their neat production functions. But the ‘actually existing economy’ rarely mirrors neo-classical models, which assume perfect competition, equal access to information, rules that apply to everyone and a lack of violence. It is only through political mobilization — nonviolent activism – that we can call attention to the ‘market imperfections’ and ‘market failures’ that have actually become remarkably ‘normal’  and ‘accepted’ in our economy. Only through politics can we have a dialogue and discussion about ways to organize, and yes, regulate, our economy so that it serves society, not the other way around.

Click here to read the article. For those who are interested, the argument is laid out in more depth in my recent book Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance (available in the UK here and in the US here).

In the decade since the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, which banned the production and use of anti-personnel mines, governments have spent over $3 billion on clearing up and mitigating the security threat of mines, cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance in the world’s current and former war zones. However, this flow of cash into regions dominated by violent social structures raises numerous political issues. Through detailed archival and field research, this book explores the politics behind the allocation and implementation of foreign aid by the US and Norway for demining in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan. It is an essential resource for practitioners and policymakers working in the field of landmine clearance and for students and researchers of development studies and post-war reconstruction.

The book has already gained critical acclaim from some high-profile academics:

‘This important book shows how foreign aid can help build human security in the aftermath of war – or, unfortunately, make the situation worse. It also demonstrates how partnerships between ‘middle powers’, like Norway, and global civil society can play a key role in building collective security through developing international law. This is an ideal text for policymakers involved in post-conflict reconstruction, as well as students of international relations.’ –Mary Kaldor CBE, Professor of Global Governance, London School of Economics

‘Matthew Bolton sheds crucial light on how foreign aid in general and demining programs in particular make compromises with power structures. He shows that links between demining agencies and the defense industry or military factions can skew attention away from vulnerable civilians most affected by mines. It should be required reading for professionals in the mine action sector.’ –Kristian Berg Harpviken, Director, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

‘This is a high-quality piece of work, well written, with interesting analysis rooted in on-the-ground fieldwork. The reservations about the involvement of private security companies in demining are extremely important, as is the discussion of the dangers of short-term contracts and ‘cut-throat’ competition in reconstruction tendering.’ –David Keen, Professor of Complex Emergencies, London School of Economics

If you are a mine action professional, the publisher IB Tauris has arranged a special 30% discount (not including shipping). To take advantage of this deal, fill out this form with the discount code 3LA and send it to IB Tauris.

As one of the many people who was involved in compiling this year’s Landmine Monitor report on Somalia, I can say with confidence that mine action professionals in Somalia, particularly in the south central region, face one of the most difficult operating environments in the world. They face ongoing conflict, complex logistics, political disorder and a lack of sufficient funding.

Click here to read my editorial.

McCaskill has also led investigations into the allegations of misconduct by ArmorGroup (now part of G4S), a security and demining contractor, in Afghanistan. For more information on my research into commercial demining contracting, click here.

In the decade since the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, which banned the production and use of anti-personnel mines, governments have spent over $3 billion on clearing up and mitigating the security threat of mines, cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance in the world’s current and former war zones. However, this flow of cash into regions dominated by violent social structures raises numerous political issues. Through detailed archival and field research, this book explores the politics behind the allocation and implementation of foreign aid by the US and Norway for demining in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan. It is an essential resource for practitioners and policymakers working in the field of landmine clearance and for students and researchers of Development Studies and post-war reconstruction.

The book is also available on Amazon USA, but at a much higher price. Click here if you want to buy it from there anyway.

Much of the debate has focussed on whether to use foreign commercial companies to conduct clearance. (See this previous Political Minefields post).  However, Maslen said the Turkish government had not adequately considered the option of using international NGOs.  Another Turkish newspaper reported that HALO Trust “were aware of the debate in Turkey and might be interested [to help] if asked.”

Research by Political Minefields in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan has suggested that using humanitarian NGOs rather than commercial companies can often be a better move for demining programs. International NGOs are often safer and better able to communicate with the local population.

Casey-Maslen also questioned plans by the government to give long-term leases on the demined land to commercial companies that cleared it.  He said the government must consider the property rights of the land’s owners.

The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has criticized this as xenophobia and the “result of a fascist mentality.”

“The opposition is blocking the efforts without proposing an alternative. We are losing time,” he said.

For more information on the issue of mine contamination in Turkey, click here.